// Global Analysis Archive
The ISW–AEI update (data cutoff January 20, 2026) reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling, and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting operations. Taiwan is strengthening leadership defense and air-defense readiness while pursuing a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment, amid domestic debate over the implications for the 'silicon shield.'
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
The January 23, 2026 AEI/ISW update reports a PLA drone flight through Taiwanese airspace over Pratas, large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations likely linked to maritime militia signaling, and PLA drills for leadership-targeting operations. It also highlights Taiwan’s countermeasures to protect senior leadership and a major US–Taiwan trade deal tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions.
The source indicates the PLAN’s Type 076 LHD Sichuan may deploy multiple GJ-21 stealth drones, potentially enhancing long-range task group reconnaissance and strike support beyond land-based sensor coverage. It also highlights PLA transport-drone testing and intensified political and legislative activity across the US, Taiwan, and Japan that could reshape deterrence dynamics in 2026.
The source reports a likely precedent-setting PLA drone penetration of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas alongside continued CCG incursions and large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. It also highlights PLA training content focused on leadership-targeting scenarios, Taiwan’s leadership-defense enhancements, and a major US–Taiwan semiconductor-linked trade deal that may reshape deterrence narratives.
The source reports that the PLA’s Type 076 LHD Sichuan may deploy multiple GJ-21 stealth drones and that the PLA is testing a heavy-lift transport UAV, developments that could strengthen long-range PLAN task group operations and improve over-the-beach resupply resilience. It also highlights US legislative moves on space cooperation and financial-institution leverage regarding Taiwan, alongside Beijing’s reported political influence priorities and rising Japan–PRC tensions after Japan’s election.
The source reports a PLA surveillance drone entering Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling, and PLA training footage emphasizing leadership-targeting operations. It also describes Taiwan’s incremental protective upgrades and a major US–Taiwan semiconductor-linked trade deal that may deepen alignment while creating new political and strategic sensitivities.
The document suggests the PLA’s Type 076 LHD Sichuan may deploy multiple GJ-21 stealth drones, improving PLAN task-group reconnaissance and strike support during long-range operations while also offering options for pre-landing shaping missions. In parallel, US legislative moves on space cooperation and financial-institution leverage, plus Japan’s LDP landslide, indicate growing regional pushback amid continued PRC political and overseas pressure on Taiwan.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update describes a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. It also highlights PLA decapitation-strike training and Taiwan’s leadership-defense upgrades, while noting a major US–Taiwan semiconductor investment-for-tariff deal that may deepen alignment but intensify domestic debate.
The source indicates the PLA may field a catapult-equipped Type 076 amphibious assault ship capable of operating multiple GJ-21 stealth drones, improving PLAN situational awareness and strike support during long-range deployments. It also highlights progress in heavy-lift transport UAVs for over-the-beach resupply, alongside intensifying cross-strait political maneuvering and rising Japan-PRC friction after Japan’s election.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 29–30, 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” drills as the largest near Taiwan in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style operations, extensive air activity, and live-fire elements. The document suggests a broader pattern of iterative exercises since 2022, complemented by persistent patrol activity and capability experimentation, while raising questions about blockade sustainment under external interference.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style tactics and air/sea access disruption. Follow-on readiness indicators in early 2026 suggest continued capability refinement and elevated coercion risks even absent confirmation of active exercises by mid-February 2026.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast than recent precedents and used multi-zone maritime activity consistent with rehearsals for constraining key air and sea routes. The episode also functioned as strategic signaling toward potential U.S. involvement, while analysts cited in the source questioned long-duration blockade sustainment under contested conditions.
Source material indicates China expanded the scale and proximity of PLA exercises around Taiwan in December 2025, emphasizing blockade practice, high-tempo air operations, and amphibious rapid assault elements. Reported January 2026 activity—including leadership-targeting training narratives and a possible Taiwanese airspace violation over Pratas—raises incident and miscalculation risks.
Source reporting through January 20, 2026 describes a PLA drone entering Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, large coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations with potential maritime militia utility, and publicized PLA drills focused on leadership-targeting scenarios. It also outlines a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions, framed as preserving Taiwan’s “silicon shield” while drawing domestic opposition criticism.
The source reports a PLA WZ-7 drone flight through Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas on January 17, 2026, alongside large PRC fishing-vessel formations and PLA training for leadership-targeting operations. Taiwan is strengthening leadership protection and expanding unmanned procurement while a major US–Taiwan semiconductor deal reshapes economic-security signaling.
The source argues PRC operations around Taiwan may be designed less to rehearse invasion than to rehearse a gray-zone quarantine that immobilizes Taiwan and delays allied decision-making. By leveraging legal ambiguity and market reactions—especially around energy shipping—coercion could accumulate without a clear threshold event that triggers unified intervention.
Source reporting describes large-scale PLA exercises near Taiwan in late 2025 focused on blockade simulation, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force integration. Follow-on nationwide drills in January 2026 and state-media-highlighted strike concepts suggest an effort to expand coercive options while increasing incident and escalation risks.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update describes an escalation in PRC gray-zone activity, including a reported PLA drone flight through Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas and coordinated fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. The report also highlights PLA leadership-targeting training and Taiwan’s countermeasures, alongside a major US–Taiwan trade deal tied to semiconductor investment and ongoing debate over the resilience of Taiwan’s “silicon shield.”
China’s Dec. 29–30 drills around Taiwan operated closer to the island than prior iterations and were assessed by analysts as the largest since 2022, emphasizing route denial and blockade-relevant tactics. The activity also served strategic signaling toward the United States, while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues Beijing may prioritize a coercive “paralysis” strategy—using ambiguous, incremental quarantine-like pressure—to immobilize Taiwan and slow allied decision-making rather than immediately pursue an amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy import dependence and market-driven shipping/insurance dynamics as key levers that could generate rapid economic pressure under legally reversible, gray-zone enforcement.
Source reporting describes near-continuous PLA activity around Taiwan in 2025, with large-scale December drills focused on blockade-style operations and high sortie rates. Early 2026 reporting highlights precision strike and special operations training alongside maritime militia-style massing, while questions persist about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contestation.
The source argues Beijing’s recent Taiwan-adjacent operations may be less about imminent invasion and more about a gray-zone quarantine strategy that externalizes risk to markets and slows allied decision-making. By exploiting legal ambiguity and Taiwan’s energy-import dependence, such pressure could coerce accommodation without crossing a single, unmistakable war threshold.
Source reporting indicates the PLA has expanded the scale, proximity, and complexity of exercises around Taiwan, emphasizing blockade-like operations and precision strike scenarios. Analysts cited in the source question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, even as operational pressure becomes more routine.
The ISW–AEI update (data cutoff January 20, 2026) reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling, and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting operations. Taiwan is strengthening leadership defense and air-defense readiness while pursuing a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment, amid domestic debate over the implications for the 'silicon shield.'
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
The January 23, 2026 AEI/ISW update reports a PLA drone flight through Taiwanese airspace over Pratas, large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations likely linked to maritime militia signaling, and PLA drills for leadership-targeting operations. It also highlights Taiwan’s countermeasures to protect senior leadership and a major US–Taiwan trade deal tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions.
The source indicates the PLAN’s Type 076 LHD Sichuan may deploy multiple GJ-21 stealth drones, potentially enhancing long-range task group reconnaissance and strike support beyond land-based sensor coverage. It also highlights PLA transport-drone testing and intensified political and legislative activity across the US, Taiwan, and Japan that could reshape deterrence dynamics in 2026.
The source reports a likely precedent-setting PLA drone penetration of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas alongside continued CCG incursions and large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. It also highlights PLA training content focused on leadership-targeting scenarios, Taiwan’s leadership-defense enhancements, and a major US–Taiwan semiconductor-linked trade deal that may reshape deterrence narratives.
The source reports that the PLA’s Type 076 LHD Sichuan may deploy multiple GJ-21 stealth drones and that the PLA is testing a heavy-lift transport UAV, developments that could strengthen long-range PLAN task group operations and improve over-the-beach resupply resilience. It also highlights US legislative moves on space cooperation and financial-institution leverage regarding Taiwan, alongside Beijing’s reported political influence priorities and rising Japan–PRC tensions after Japan’s election.
The source reports a PLA surveillance drone entering Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling, and PLA training footage emphasizing leadership-targeting operations. It also describes Taiwan’s incremental protective upgrades and a major US–Taiwan semiconductor-linked trade deal that may deepen alignment while creating new political and strategic sensitivities.
The document suggests the PLA’s Type 076 LHD Sichuan may deploy multiple GJ-21 stealth drones, improving PLAN task-group reconnaissance and strike support during long-range operations while also offering options for pre-landing shaping missions. In parallel, US legislative moves on space cooperation and financial-institution leverage, plus Japan’s LDP landslide, indicate growing regional pushback amid continued PRC political and overseas pressure on Taiwan.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update describes a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. It also highlights PLA decapitation-strike training and Taiwan’s leadership-defense upgrades, while noting a major US–Taiwan semiconductor investment-for-tariff deal that may deepen alignment but intensify domestic debate.
The source indicates the PLA may field a catapult-equipped Type 076 amphibious assault ship capable of operating multiple GJ-21 stealth drones, improving PLAN situational awareness and strike support during long-range deployments. It also highlights progress in heavy-lift transport UAVs for over-the-beach resupply, alongside intensifying cross-strait political maneuvering and rising Japan-PRC friction after Japan’s election.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 29–30, 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” drills as the largest near Taiwan in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style operations, extensive air activity, and live-fire elements. The document suggests a broader pattern of iterative exercises since 2022, complemented by persistent patrol activity and capability experimentation, while raising questions about blockade sustainment under external interference.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style tactics and air/sea access disruption. Follow-on readiness indicators in early 2026 suggest continued capability refinement and elevated coercion risks even absent confirmation of active exercises by mid-February 2026.
Late-December 2025 PLA drills operated closer to Taiwan’s coast than recent precedents and used multi-zone maritime activity consistent with rehearsals for constraining key air and sea routes. The episode also functioned as strategic signaling toward potential U.S. involvement, while analysts cited in the source questioned long-duration blockade sustainment under contested conditions.
Source material indicates China expanded the scale and proximity of PLA exercises around Taiwan in December 2025, emphasizing blockade practice, high-tempo air operations, and amphibious rapid assault elements. Reported January 2026 activity—including leadership-targeting training narratives and a possible Taiwanese airspace violation over Pratas—raises incident and miscalculation risks.
Source reporting through January 20, 2026 describes a PLA drone entering Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, large coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations with potential maritime militia utility, and publicized PLA drills focused on leadership-targeting scenarios. It also outlines a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions, framed as preserving Taiwan’s “silicon shield” while drawing domestic opposition criticism.
The source reports a PLA WZ-7 drone flight through Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas on January 17, 2026, alongside large PRC fishing-vessel formations and PLA training for leadership-targeting operations. Taiwan is strengthening leadership protection and expanding unmanned procurement while a major US–Taiwan semiconductor deal reshapes economic-security signaling.
The source argues PRC operations around Taiwan may be designed less to rehearse invasion than to rehearse a gray-zone quarantine that immobilizes Taiwan and delays allied decision-making. By leveraging legal ambiguity and market reactions—especially around energy shipping—coercion could accumulate without a clear threshold event that triggers unified intervention.
Source reporting describes large-scale PLA exercises near Taiwan in late 2025 focused on blockade simulation, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force integration. Follow-on nationwide drills in January 2026 and state-media-highlighted strike concepts suggest an effort to expand coercive options while increasing incident and escalation risks.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update describes an escalation in PRC gray-zone activity, including a reported PLA drone flight through Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas and coordinated fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. The report also highlights PLA leadership-targeting training and Taiwan’s countermeasures, alongside a major US–Taiwan trade deal tied to semiconductor investment and ongoing debate over the resilience of Taiwan’s “silicon shield.”
China’s Dec. 29–30 drills around Taiwan operated closer to the island than prior iterations and were assessed by analysts as the largest since 2022, emphasizing route denial and blockade-relevant tactics. The activity also served strategic signaling toward the United States, while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues Beijing may prioritize a coercive “paralysis” strategy—using ambiguous, incremental quarantine-like pressure—to immobilize Taiwan and slow allied decision-making rather than immediately pursue an amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy import dependence and market-driven shipping/insurance dynamics as key levers that could generate rapid economic pressure under legally reversible, gray-zone enforcement.
Source reporting describes near-continuous PLA activity around Taiwan in 2025, with large-scale December drills focused on blockade-style operations and high sortie rates. Early 2026 reporting highlights precision strike and special operations training alongside maritime militia-style massing, while questions persist about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contestation.
The source argues Beijing’s recent Taiwan-adjacent operations may be less about imminent invasion and more about a gray-zone quarantine strategy that externalizes risk to markets and slows allied decision-making. By exploiting legal ambiguity and Taiwan’s energy-import dependence, such pressure could coerce accommodation without crossing a single, unmistakable war threshold.
Source reporting indicates the PLA has expanded the scale, proximity, and complexity of exercises around Taiwan, emphasizing blockade-like operations and precision strike scenarios. Analysts cited in the source question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, even as operational pressure becomes more routine.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1392 | PRC Raises Pressure on Taiwan with Pratas Airspace Probe, Maritime Militia Signaling, and Decapitation-Strike Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1386 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Normalizes Close-In Blockade Rehearsals Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1334 | Pratas Airspace Breach and Maritime Militia Signaling Raise Cross-Strait Escalation Risks | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1333 | PLA Type 076 ‘Sichuan’ and UAV Logistics Signal a Broader Shift in Cross-Strait Power Projection | PLA Navy | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1266 | PRC Pressure Campaign Intensifies: Airspace Breach, Maritime Militia Signaling, and Decapitation-Strike Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1265 | Type 076 ‘Sichuan’ and Drone Logistics Signal PLA Push for Far-Seas Reach as Taiwan Political Contest Intensifies | PLA modernization | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1250 | PRC Raises Pressure on Taiwan’s Periphery as Drone Airspace Breach, Maritime Militia Signaling, and Decapitation Drills Converge | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1249 | PLA Type 076 ‘Drone Carrier’ Signals Expanded Far-Seas Reach as Taiwan Pressure Lines Intensify | PLA modernization | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1246 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and External Deterrence | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1164 | Pratas Airspace Probe and Maritime Militia Signaling Raise Cross-Strait Threshold Risks | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1162 | PLA Unmanned Maritime Leap: Type 076 ‘Sichuan’ Drone Operations and Contested Logistics Signal Wider Western Pacific Ambitions | PLA modernization | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1160 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade Simulation Near Taiwan Signals Evolving Coercive Playbook | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1123 | PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Drills Intensify: ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Sustained Cross-Strait Pressure | PLA | 2026-02-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1036 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1035 | PLA Raises Pressure on Taiwan with Blockade Rehearsals and Boundary-Testing Operations | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-996 | PRC Raises Pressure Thresholds Around Taiwan as US–Taiwan Semiconductor Deal Reshapes Strategic Calculus | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-995 | PLA Airspace Probe Over Pratas Signals Escalating Gray-Zone Pressure as Taiwan Scales Asymmetric Defenses | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-993 | Deterrence by Denial vs. Coercive Quarantine: How Taiwan Strait Pressure Could Target Markets and Decision Cycles | China | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-992 | PLA’s Late-2025 Taiwan Drills Signal Blockade Readiness and Joint-Force Escalation into Early 2026 | PLA | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-964 | PRC Gray-Zone Pressure Intensifies: Pratas Airspace Probe, Maritime Militia Signaling, and Decapitation-Strike Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-961 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-960 | Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: How a Quarantine Strategy Could Bypass Red Lines | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-959 | PLA Normalizes High-Tempo Operations Around Taiwan, Emphasizing Blockade and Precision Strike Training | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-930 | Deterrence by Denial May Be Bypassed: The Quarantine-Paralysis Challenge in the Taiwan Strait | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-929 | PLA Drills Around Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Escalation Testing | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |