// Global Analysis Archive
According to the source, China’s Ministry of State Security has highlighted alleged espionage and data-theft cases involving rare earth reserves/pricing, semiconductor processes, and large-scale commercial data. The reporting suggests Beijing is merging traceability and penalty regimes with counter-espionage enforcement, increasing compliance and information-access risks for foreign firms.
According to the source, China controls around 70% of global rare earth ore extraction and roughly 90% of processing, and remains the only large-scale producer of heavy rare earth ores. Industrialised countries are pursuing diversification, substitution, recycling, and collaboration, but long lead times suggest China’s dominance will remain largely intact before 2030.
A February 2022 USCC testimony by Mandiant assesses that China-linked cyber espionage has become stealthier and more agile since 2016, with increased use of vulnerability exploitation, third-party compromise, and software supply-chain compromise. The testimony emphasizes that the activity is distinguished primarily by national-interest-driven targeting and scale, and notes a higher tolerance for operational risk in 2020–2021.
According to the source, China’s Ministry of State Security has highlighted alleged espionage and data-theft cases involving rare earth reserves/pricing, semiconductor processes, and large-scale commercial data. The reporting suggests Beijing is merging traceability and penalty regimes with counter-espionage enforcement, increasing compliance and information-access risks for foreign firms.
According to the source, China controls around 70% of global rare earth ore extraction and roughly 90% of processing, and remains the only large-scale producer of heavy rare earth ores. Industrialised countries are pursuing diversification, substitution, recycling, and collaboration, but long lead times suggest China’s dominance will remain largely intact before 2030.
A February 2022 USCC testimony by Mandiant assesses that China-linked cyber espionage has become stealthier and more agile since 2016, with increased use of vulnerability exploitation, third-party compromise, and software supply-chain compromise. The testimony emphasizes that the activity is distinguished primarily by national-interest-driven targeting and scale, and notes a higher tolerance for operational risk in 2020–2021.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-4394 | China Signals Tighter Security Perimeter Around Rare Earth Data and Supply Chains | Rare Earths | 2026-04-30 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-3620 | Rare Earth Chokepoints: Why China’s Processing Lead Is Likely to Hold Until 2030 | Rare Earth Elements | 2023-08-06 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-161 | Mandiant Testimony to USCC: Evolving China-Linked Cyber Espionage Tradecraft and Scale | Cyber Espionage | 2022-10-17 | 1 | ACCESS » |