// Global Analysis Archive
A March 2025 analysis argues U.S. semiconductor and AI export controls on China will succeed or fail largely based on uncertain timelines for transformative AI and China’s ability to achieve chip self-sufficiency. The document highlights adaptation by Chinese firms, uneven impacts on U.S. industry, Taiwan-linked systemic supply-chain risk, and the need for multilateral coordination and flexible policy design.
The source argues U.S. export controls on AI chips and semiconductor equipment will succeed or fail largely based on whether transformative AI arrives within a few years or over a decade-long horizon. It highlights China’s adaptation, uneven impacts on U.S. firms, Taiwan’s supply-chain chokepoint, and the need for multilateral cooperation and flexible policy design.
The source argues that the effectiveness of U.S. semiconductor and AI export controls hinges on whether transformative AI arrives within a few years or over a decade, which would give China time to build domestic capacity. It also highlights China’s adaptation, the need for allied coordination (notably Japan and the Netherlands), and the outsized economic risk posed by any disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor production.
A March 2025 analysis argues U.S. semiconductor and AI export controls on China will succeed or fail largely based on uncertain timelines for transformative AI and China’s ability to achieve chip self-sufficiency. The document highlights adaptation by Chinese firms, uneven impacts on U.S. industry, Taiwan-linked systemic supply-chain risk, and the need for multilateral coordination and flexible policy design.
The source argues U.S. export controls on AI chips and semiconductor equipment will succeed or fail largely based on whether transformative AI arrives within a few years or over a decade-long horizon. It highlights China’s adaptation, uneven impacts on U.S. firms, Taiwan’s supply-chain chokepoint, and the need for multilateral cooperation and flexible policy design.
The source argues that the effectiveness of U.S. semiconductor and AI export controls hinges on whether transformative AI arrives within a few years or over a decade, which would give China time to build domestic capacity. It also highlights China’s adaptation, the need for allied coordination (notably Japan and the Netherlands), and the outsized economic risk posed by any disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor production.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-405 | Export Controls, AI Timelines, and Taiwan: The Strategic Tradeoffs in U.S. Semiconductor Restrictions | Export Controls | 2025-11-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-110 | U.S. AI Chip Export Controls: Timeline Uncertainty, China’s Adaptation, and Taiwan-Linked Strategic Risk | Export Controls | 2025-09-23 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1227 | U.S. AI Chip Export Controls: Timeline Uncertainty, China’s Adaptation, and Taiwan’s Systemic Risk | Export Controls | 2025-09-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |