// Global Analysis Archive
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
The source argues that senior-level personnel removals in China’s military and defense-industrial system coexist with, and may even facilitate, continued PLA capability development aimed at Taiwan. It highlights recurring large-scale exercises through end-2025—especially Justice Mission 2025—and signs of maritime-coercion preparation, while noting enduring joint-integration and cross-Strait lift constraints.
The source argues that senior-level disciplinary removals in China’s military and defense sector are occurring alongside sustained progress in PLA readiness and Taiwan-focused operational preparation. Recurring large-scale exercises, maritime-coercion rehearsals, and organized “fishing vessel” formations are presented as cumulative steps that may expand Beijing’s options from coercion to blockade or, in higher-risk scenarios, invasion.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style tactics and air/sea access disruption. Follow-on readiness indicators in early 2026 suggest continued capability refinement and elevated coercion risks even absent confirmation of active exercises by mid-February 2026.
Source reporting indicates the PLA has expanded the scale, proximity, and complexity of exercises around Taiwan, emphasizing blockade-like operations and precision strike scenarios. Analysts cited in the source question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, even as operational pressure becomes more routine.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale blockade rehearsal around Taiwan, integrating PLA air, naval, rocket forces and China Coast Guard activity near outlying islands. Taiwan’s January 2026 drills and U.S. calls for dialogue underscore rising operational tempo and increased escalation risk tied to proximity and signaling dynamics.
According to the source, China’s December 29–30, 2025 exercises near Taiwan featured live-fire activity and simulated blockade operations, marking the largest-scale drills in over three years. Taiwan’s subsequent high-visibility defensive drills and U.S. calls for de-escalation highlight a sustained signaling cycle with elevated operational and civilian-disruption risks.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 drills as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade simulation, closer-in fires, and high-tempo air operations while omitting aircraft carriers. Taiwan’s layered defense drills and U.S. calls for restraint highlight rising escalation risks and an intensifying action–reaction cycle.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PRC exercise near Taiwan focused on blockade simulation and PLA–CCG coordination, alongside elevated ADIZ activity. Follow-on drills into early 2026 suggest sustained joint-readiness signaling that increases escalation and incident risk around Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The source describes large-scale PLA drills near Taiwan in late December 2025, followed by continued high-tempo activity into January 2026, interpreted by analysts as rehearsal for coercive options such as blockade-like operations. The pattern suggests a move from episodic signaling to normalized pressure designed to test responses and shape the operating environment, while sustainment in a prolonged contingency remains an open question.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PLA exercise near Taiwan featuring closer operating areas, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force elements consistent with blockade and precision-strike rehearsal. The same document notes potential sustainability constraints for prolonged blockade operations, but indicates rising crisis instability due to proximity operations and unmanned activity.
Source reporting indicates the PLA intensified activity around Taiwan in late 2025 and early 2026, including large-scale “Justice Mission 2025” drills and a reported drone overflight of Pratas (Dongsha) Island. The pattern suggests increasing operational realism—blockade rehearsal, joint strike training, and leadership-targeting messaging—while elevating risks of miscalculation and commercial disruption.
Late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan featured unusually close-in activity and were described as practice for disrupting major air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited in the document assess the drills as a blockade-style test run and a strategic signal aimed at deterring potential U.S. involvement while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.
ASPI’s 2025 tracking data indicates Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is nearly continuous, with fluctuations more closely tied to weather, holidays, and internal political-security calendars than to external events. The source argues that many actions framed as responses to provocation are better understood as routine readiness-building and planned training, with signalling increasingly secondary.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese military activity around Taiwan is increasingly continuous and shaped more by internal readiness cycles, holidays, and weather than by external political triggers. The resulting routinisation reduces the clarity of signalling and complicates efforts to infer intent from day-to-day fluctuations.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan as the largest in more than three years, combining high-volume air and maritime deployments with live-fire elements and simulated blockade activity. The document suggests these surges increasingly reflect internal readiness cycles and continuous operational pressure rather than purely event-driven political signaling.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills around Taiwan that Taiwanese analysts described as the largest since 2022 and closer to the island’s coast than recent precedents. The activity appears to test elements of a blockade concept while signaling deterrence toward potential external intervention amid heightened U.S.-Taiwan defense dynamics.
The source describes a major PLA exercise around Taiwan on 29–30 December 2025 featuring dense air sorties, naval and coast guard coordination, and live-fire elements. Analysts cited in the document interpret the activity as rehearsal for blockade-style options and strategic messaging toward the United States amid heightened cross-strait and defense policy tensions.
ASPI-linked 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal schedules, weather constraints, and readiness objectives. The source argues many apparent ‘signals’ are better understood as routine preparation with external events used for opportunistic justification.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests China’s military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal readiness cycles, holidays and weather rather than external political triggers. The source argues that many apparent ‘signals’ function as opportunistic justifications for planned operations, indicating systematic preparation on Beijing’s timetable.
The source argues that China’s late-2025 Justice Mission exercises mark a qualitative escalation by normalizing PLA and China Coast Guard activity inside Taiwan’s contiguous zone, eroding a key buffer short of territorial waters. This shift increases miscalculation risk, strengthens blockade-rehearsal signaling, and exposes a gap in partner messaging that has not explicitly addressed the new operational threshold.
The source describes China’s late-2025 Justice Mission exercises as a qualitative escalation due to significant PLA and China Coast Guard activity inside Taiwan’s contiguous zone. This pattern may erode a key de-escalation buffer, raising miscalculation risk and enabling incremental redefinition of the cross-strait operational status quo.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
The source argues that senior-level personnel removals in China’s military and defense-industrial system coexist with, and may even facilitate, continued PLA capability development aimed at Taiwan. It highlights recurring large-scale exercises through end-2025—especially Justice Mission 2025—and signs of maritime-coercion preparation, while noting enduring joint-integration and cross-Strait lift constraints.
The source argues that senior-level disciplinary removals in China’s military and defense sector are occurring alongside sustained progress in PLA readiness and Taiwan-focused operational preparation. Recurring large-scale exercises, maritime-coercion rehearsals, and organized “fishing vessel” formations are presented as cumulative steps that may expand Beijing’s options from coercion to blockade or, in higher-risk scenarios, invasion.
Source reporting describes the PLA’s December 2025 ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills near Taiwan as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade-style tactics and air/sea access disruption. Follow-on readiness indicators in early 2026 suggest continued capability refinement and elevated coercion risks even absent confirmation of active exercises by mid-February 2026.
Source reporting indicates the PLA has expanded the scale, proximity, and complexity of exercises around Taiwan, emphasizing blockade-like operations and precision strike scenarios. Analysts cited in the source question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, even as operational pressure becomes more routine.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale blockade rehearsal around Taiwan, integrating PLA air, naval, rocket forces and China Coast Guard activity near outlying islands. Taiwan’s January 2026 drills and U.S. calls for dialogue underscore rising operational tempo and increased escalation risk tied to proximity and signaling dynamics.
According to the source, China’s December 29–30, 2025 exercises near Taiwan featured live-fire activity and simulated blockade operations, marking the largest-scale drills in over three years. Taiwan’s subsequent high-visibility defensive drills and U.S. calls for de-escalation highlight a sustained signaling cycle with elevated operational and civilian-disruption risks.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 drills as the largest in over three years, emphasizing blockade simulation, closer-in fires, and high-tempo air operations while omitting aircraft carriers. Taiwan’s layered defense drills and U.S. calls for restraint highlight rising escalation risks and an intensifying action–reaction cycle.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PRC exercise near Taiwan focused on blockade simulation and PLA–CCG coordination, alongside elevated ADIZ activity. Follow-on drills into early 2026 suggest sustained joint-readiness signaling that increases escalation and incident risk around Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The source describes large-scale PLA drills near Taiwan in late December 2025, followed by continued high-tempo activity into January 2026, interpreted by analysts as rehearsal for coercive options such as blockade-like operations. The pattern suggests a move from episodic signaling to normalized pressure designed to test responses and shape the operating environment, while sustainment in a prolonged contingency remains an open question.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PLA exercise near Taiwan featuring closer operating areas, high-tempo air activity, and joint-force elements consistent with blockade and precision-strike rehearsal. The same document notes potential sustainability constraints for prolonged blockade operations, but indicates rising crisis instability due to proximity operations and unmanned activity.
Source reporting indicates the PLA intensified activity around Taiwan in late 2025 and early 2026, including large-scale “Justice Mission 2025” drills and a reported drone overflight of Pratas (Dongsha) Island. The pattern suggests increasing operational realism—blockade rehearsal, joint strike training, and leadership-targeting messaging—while elevating risks of miscalculation and commercial disruption.
Late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan featured unusually close-in activity and were described as practice for disrupting major air and sea routes, according to the source. Analysts cited in the document assess the drills as a blockade-style test run and a strategic signal aimed at deterring potential U.S. involvement while raising questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain prolonged operations.
ASPI’s 2025 tracking data indicates Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is nearly continuous, with fluctuations more closely tied to weather, holidays, and internal political-security calendars than to external events. The source argues that many actions framed as responses to provocation are better understood as routine readiness-building and planned training, with signalling increasingly secondary.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese military activity around Taiwan is increasingly continuous and shaped more by internal readiness cycles, holidays, and weather than by external political triggers. The resulting routinisation reduces the clarity of signalling and complicates efforts to infer intent from day-to-day fluctuations.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan as the largest in more than three years, combining high-volume air and maritime deployments with live-fire elements and simulated blockade activity. The document suggests these surges increasingly reflect internal readiness cycles and continuous operational pressure rather than purely event-driven political signaling.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills around Taiwan that Taiwanese analysts described as the largest since 2022 and closer to the island’s coast than recent precedents. The activity appears to test elements of a blockade concept while signaling deterrence toward potential external intervention amid heightened U.S.-Taiwan defense dynamics.
The source describes a major PLA exercise around Taiwan on 29–30 December 2025 featuring dense air sorties, naval and coast guard coordination, and live-fire elements. Analysts cited in the document interpret the activity as rehearsal for blockade-style options and strategic messaging toward the United States amid heightened cross-strait and defense policy tensions.
ASPI-linked 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests Chinese air and maritime activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal schedules, weather constraints, and readiness objectives. The source argues many apparent ‘signals’ are better understood as routine preparation with external events used for opportunistic justification.
ASPI’s 2025 coercion-tracking data suggests China’s military activity around Taiwan is near-continuous and increasingly shaped by internal readiness cycles, holidays and weather rather than external political triggers. The source argues that many apparent ‘signals’ function as opportunistic justifications for planned operations, indicating systematic preparation on Beijing’s timetable.
The source argues that China’s late-2025 Justice Mission exercises mark a qualitative escalation by normalizing PLA and China Coast Guard activity inside Taiwan’s contiguous zone, eroding a key buffer short of territorial waters. This shift increases miscalculation risk, strengthens blockade-rehearsal signaling, and exposes a gap in partner messaging that has not explicitly addressed the new operational threshold.
The source describes China’s late-2025 Justice Mission exercises as a qualitative escalation due to significant PLA and China Coast Guard activity inside Taiwan’s contiguous zone. This pattern may erode a key de-escalation buffer, raising miscalculation risk and enabling incremental redefinition of the cross-strait operational status quo.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1386 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Normalizes Close-In Blockade Rehearsals Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1331 | Forest Over Trees: PLA Capability Growth Continues Amid Leadership Removals and Taiwan-Focused Rehearsals | PLA | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1264 | Forest Over Trees: PRC Purges Coincide With Accelerating Taiwan-Focused Military Preparation | China | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1123 | PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Drills Intensify: ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Sustained Cross-Strait Pressure | PLA | 2026-02-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-929 | PLA Drills Around Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Escalation Testing | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-618 | Justice Mission 2025: Blockade Rehearsal Signals Higher-Tempo Cross-Strait Pressure | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-03 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-510 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Blockade Signaling Near Taiwan and the Emerging Cycle of Counter-Readiness | PLA | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-456 | Justice Mission 2025 Signals a More Credible PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | PLA | 2026-01-31 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-365 | Blockade-Centric Signaling: PRC ‘Justice Mission 2025’ and the Intensification of Cross-Strait Pressure | Taiwan Strait | 2026-01-30 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-314 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Signals Shift Toward Routine, Blockade-Relevant Pressure on Taiwan | PLA | 2026-01-29 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-190 | PLA Expands Taiwan Pressure with Near-Baseline Drills and Blockade Rehearsals | PLA | 2026-01-25 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-185 | PLA Raises Operational Pressure Around Taiwan with Blockade-Style Drills and Airspace Probing | PLA | 2026-01-25 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-369 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and U.S. Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-12-24 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1247 | Beyond Signalling: 2025 Patterns Suggest China’s Taiwan Operations Follow Internal Readiness Cycles | China | 2025-12-06 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1389 | From Signalling to System: What 2025 Patterns Suggest About PLA Operations Around Taiwan | China | 2025-11-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1245 | Justice Mission 2025 Signals a Readiness-Driven Shift in PLA Pressure Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2025-11-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-994 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2025-10-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1262 | Justice Mission-2025 Signals Intensifying PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | PLA | 2025-09-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-188 | Taiwan Strait 2025: PLA Operational Tempo Looks Increasingly Driven by Internal Readiness Cycles | China | 2025-09-12 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-963 | Taiwan Strait 2025: Continuous PLA Presence Points to Readiness Cycles Over Reactive Signalling | China | 2025-09-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-621 | PLA Drills Shift the Pressure Line: Taiwan’s Contiguous Zone Becomes the New Flashpoint | Taiwan Strait | 2025-08-25 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-367 | China’s Taiwan Drills Shift Toward Contiguous-Zone Normalization | Taiwan Strait | 2025-07-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |