// Global Analysis Archive
The Diplomat reports that Bangladesh’s BNP victory under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman is driving rapid political and defense engagement with Pakistan after the 2024 uprising reshaped Dhaka’s external posture. The article suggests Bangladesh–India frictions and exploratory China–Pakistan–Bangladesh cooperation could widen strategic options for Dhaka while increasing regional sensitivity.
Japan’s parliament has reappointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after an election delivered the LDP a two-thirds lower-house supermajority, enabling accelerated action on defence, immigration, and conservative social policy. The agenda faces near-term constraints from inflation and wage pressures, while external risks rise from tighter US alignment and renewed China-related retaliation dynamics tied to Taiwan signalling and symbolic diplomacy.
A Malaysia-based engineering study cited by the source argues that rare earth separation—especially magnet-grade neodymium/praseodymium and heavy rare earth processing—remains the hardest step to replicate, reinforcing China’s structural advantage. US and allied initiatives are expanding mine-to-magnet capacity and financing overseas projects, but scale-up timelines and technology constraints suggest continued near-term dependence.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues China’s rare earth dominance stems less from geology than from policy-enabled scale in processing and a global shift of refining capacity toward the lowest-cost regulatory environment. It suggests that tighter export management and rising geopolitical risk are increasing incentives for alternative supply chains, though rebuilding non-Chinese processing capacity will take years.
The source indicates China retains decisive control over rare earth processing/separation and magnet manufacturing, creating a durable chokepoint even as new mines emerge elsewhere. Diversification efforts face scale, technical, and market-structure barriers, with projections suggesting China remains the leading refiner through 2030.
The 2026 Singapore Airshow highlighted a defense-industrial pivot toward low-cost, mass-producible unmanned systems, manpower-saving training technologies, and counter-UAV concepts constrained by energy demands. It also signaled intensifying supply-chain realignment driven by geopolitical alignment and resilience, alongside Singapore’s push to integrate space capabilities via a new national space agency.
China and South Korea held working-level defense talks in Beijing on Feb. 5, 2026, with discussions reportedly including resuming joint maritime search-and-rescue drills. The focus on humanitarian cooperation suggests a cautious effort to manage operational risk and restore limited military-to-military engagement in a sensitive maritime theater.
According to SCMP, researchers at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics flight-tested an aerodynamic thrust-vectoring nozzle on a high-subsonic drone, claiming improved manoeuvrability without complex moving parts. The demonstration could support lighter, more maintainable high-performance UAV designs, though key performance metrics and scalability remain unclear from the source.
The source reports PRC investigations into two senior PLA leaders framed as removing political obstacles to the PLA’s 2027 modernization milestone, reinforcing Xi Jinping’s command authority. In parallel, Beijing resumed high-level exchanges with Taiwan’s KMT while Taiwan’s legislature advanced a reduced asymmetric defense budget that omits major air defense and drone investments amid persistent gray-zone pressure.
India’s FY2026–27 defense allocation rises to Rs 7.85 trillion, a 15 percent increase, with the source linking the shift to modernization priorities following the May 2025 Operation Sindoor strikes. Procurement emphasis spans fighters, submarines, unmanned systems, and amphibious capabilities, alongside measures to strengthen domestic defense manufacturing and MRO capacity.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
The January 30, 2026 ISW–AEI update highlights Xi Jinping’s expanded PLA purges, a US 2026 NDS that deemphasizes PRC competition and omits Taiwan, and Taiwan’s push for deeper defense-industrial integration amid contested defense budgeting. It also underscores PLA advances in unmanned systems for amphibious enabling operations and persistent PRC-linked influence activity targeting Taiwan’s political and military ecosystems.
The source describes intensified PLA leadership purges alongside accelerating PRC unmanned and maritime strike capabilities relevant to a Taiwan contingency. It also highlights a 2026 US NDS that deemphasizes explicit PRC/Taiwan framing and a Taiwan legislative budget dispute that could constrain integrated air and missile defense and defense supply-chain resilience.
Reporting indicates the United States and Taiwan are preparing a Joint Firepower Cooperation Center to improve coordination, targeting, and asymmetric air and maritime defense ahead of a potential high-intensity contingency. The initiative appears to pair training and operational integration with industrial steps in Taiwan to support munitions testing and unmanned systems supply chains.
The source argues that China-Pakistan relations remain strategically resilient, driven by defense cooperation and Beijing’s interest in Pakistan as a counterweight to India. However, the viability of a renewed economic partnership via “CPEC 2.0” hinges on Pakistan’s security environment, fiscal constraints, and the complications introduced by improving U.S.-Pakistan ties.
The source argues China’s rare earth advantage is rooted in processing concentration enabled by long-term policy and regulatory asymmetries rather than true mineral scarcity. It assesses that export controls and licensing raise prices and uncertainty, catalyzing diversification efforts that can erode dominance over time even as near-term dependence persists.
Open-source reporting indicates the United States and Taiwan are developing a Joint Firepower Cooperation Center to improve asymmetric air and maritime defense through better coordination, training, and potential integration of U.S.-linked capabilities. The initiative appears aligned to a 2027 planning horizon and emphasizes air denial, ISR improvements, and industrial enablement while maintaining ambiguity on troop presence and operational details.
The source reports expanded PLA senior-level purges that further concentrate authority under Xi Jinping, potentially improving control while increasing miscalculation risk. It also describes a 2026 US National Defense Strategy that may be perceived as less confrontational toward the PRC, alongside Taiwan defense integration efforts constrained by opposition-led cuts to air defense and supply-chain resilience funding.
The source reports intensified PLA senior purges that consolidate Xi Jinping’s control while potentially increasing miscalculation risk, alongside a 2026 US National Defense Strategy that deemphasizes PRC competition and omits Taiwan. Taiwan is advancing defense testing and joint firepower coordination concepts, but opposition-led budget proposals could reduce IAMD and supply-chain resilience as PRC influence activity and PLA unmanned modernization accelerate.
Two days of PLA drills on Dec. 29–30 operated closer to Taiwan’s coast and were assessed by analysts in the source as the largest since 2022, with activity consistent with rehearsing blockade-relevant tasks. The episode also highlighted immediate coercive effects through civilian route disruption while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The January 30, 2026 update highlights intensified PLA senior-level purges that further centralize authority under Xi Jinping alongside rapid PLA modernization in unmanned systems and maritime strike. It also underscores Taiwan’s push for deeper defense-industrial integration and joint firepower coordination, constrained by legislative disputes over funding for integrated air and missile defense and resilient supply chains.
Japan and the Philippines are expanding defense cooperation through the RAA, OSA, and ACSA, enabling more regular and scalable joint operations along the First Island Chain. The source suggests this is stitching together the East China Sea and South China Sea into a more connected theater, complicating China’s ability to manage maritime tensions as separate fronts.
Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense acknowledged multiple non-combat servicemen deaths in early 2026 and announced emergency measures focused on discipline, safety, psychological screening, and expanded monitoring. The measures are described broadly, and the source notes limited detail on implementation amid ongoing public concern about conscription-related welfare and accountability.
China’s defence ministry said attempts to contain China are “doomed to fail,” while expressing willingness to work with Washington ahead of a reported April Trump–Xi meeting. The US 2026 National Defense Strategy, as described by the source, promotes “respectful relations” but continues to prioritise Indo-Pacific deterrence and denial capabilities along the First Island Chain.
The Diplomat reports that Bangladesh’s BNP victory under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman is driving rapid political and defense engagement with Pakistan after the 2024 uprising reshaped Dhaka’s external posture. The article suggests Bangladesh–India frictions and exploratory China–Pakistan–Bangladesh cooperation could widen strategic options for Dhaka while increasing regional sensitivity.
Japan’s parliament has reappointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after an election delivered the LDP a two-thirds lower-house supermajority, enabling accelerated action on defence, immigration, and conservative social policy. The agenda faces near-term constraints from inflation and wage pressures, while external risks rise from tighter US alignment and renewed China-related retaliation dynamics tied to Taiwan signalling and symbolic diplomacy.
A Malaysia-based engineering study cited by the source argues that rare earth separation—especially magnet-grade neodymium/praseodymium and heavy rare earth processing—remains the hardest step to replicate, reinforcing China’s structural advantage. US and allied initiatives are expanding mine-to-magnet capacity and financing overseas projects, but scale-up timelines and technology constraints suggest continued near-term dependence.
China’s PLA Eastern Theater Command conducted Dec. 29–30 drills near Taiwan that Taiwanese officials and analysts described as unusually close and among the largest in several years, emphasizing simulated route-blocking operations. The episode highlights intensifying deterrence competition with the United States while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The source argues China’s rare earth dominance stems less from geology than from policy-enabled scale in processing and a global shift of refining capacity toward the lowest-cost regulatory environment. It suggests that tighter export management and rising geopolitical risk are increasing incentives for alternative supply chains, though rebuilding non-Chinese processing capacity will take years.
The source indicates China retains decisive control over rare earth processing/separation and magnet manufacturing, creating a durable chokepoint even as new mines emerge elsewhere. Diversification efforts face scale, technical, and market-structure barriers, with projections suggesting China remains the leading refiner through 2030.
The 2026 Singapore Airshow highlighted a defense-industrial pivot toward low-cost, mass-producible unmanned systems, manpower-saving training technologies, and counter-UAV concepts constrained by energy demands. It also signaled intensifying supply-chain realignment driven by geopolitical alignment and resilience, alongside Singapore’s push to integrate space capabilities via a new national space agency.
China and South Korea held working-level defense talks in Beijing on Feb. 5, 2026, with discussions reportedly including resuming joint maritime search-and-rescue drills. The focus on humanitarian cooperation suggests a cautious effort to manage operational risk and restore limited military-to-military engagement in a sensitive maritime theater.
According to SCMP, researchers at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics flight-tested an aerodynamic thrust-vectoring nozzle on a high-subsonic drone, claiming improved manoeuvrability without complex moving parts. The demonstration could support lighter, more maintainable high-performance UAV designs, though key performance metrics and scalability remain unclear from the source.
The source reports PRC investigations into two senior PLA leaders framed as removing political obstacles to the PLA’s 2027 modernization milestone, reinforcing Xi Jinping’s command authority. In parallel, Beijing resumed high-level exchanges with Taiwan’s KMT while Taiwan’s legislature advanced a reduced asymmetric defense budget that omits major air defense and drone investments amid persistent gray-zone pressure.
India’s FY2026–27 defense allocation rises to Rs 7.85 trillion, a 15 percent increase, with the source linking the shift to modernization priorities following the May 2025 Operation Sindoor strikes. Procurement emphasis spans fighters, submarines, unmanned systems, and amphibious capabilities, alongside measures to strengthen domestic defense manufacturing and MRO capacity.
A Belfer Center-hosted International Security article argues that U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait remains robust absent a Taiwan declaration of independence, grounded in U.S. warfighting capability and escalation dominance. It cautions that post-1996 policy assumptions and insufficiently rigorous deterrence analysis can heighten misperception and escalation risks.
The January 30, 2026 ISW–AEI update highlights Xi Jinping’s expanded PLA purges, a US 2026 NDS that deemphasizes PRC competition and omits Taiwan, and Taiwan’s push for deeper defense-industrial integration amid contested defense budgeting. It also underscores PLA advances in unmanned systems for amphibious enabling operations and persistent PRC-linked influence activity targeting Taiwan’s political and military ecosystems.
The source describes intensified PLA leadership purges alongside accelerating PRC unmanned and maritime strike capabilities relevant to a Taiwan contingency. It also highlights a 2026 US NDS that deemphasizes explicit PRC/Taiwan framing and a Taiwan legislative budget dispute that could constrain integrated air and missile defense and defense supply-chain resilience.
Reporting indicates the United States and Taiwan are preparing a Joint Firepower Cooperation Center to improve coordination, targeting, and asymmetric air and maritime defense ahead of a potential high-intensity contingency. The initiative appears to pair training and operational integration with industrial steps in Taiwan to support munitions testing and unmanned systems supply chains.
The source argues that China-Pakistan relations remain strategically resilient, driven by defense cooperation and Beijing’s interest in Pakistan as a counterweight to India. However, the viability of a renewed economic partnership via “CPEC 2.0” hinges on Pakistan’s security environment, fiscal constraints, and the complications introduced by improving U.S.-Pakistan ties.
The source argues China’s rare earth advantage is rooted in processing concentration enabled by long-term policy and regulatory asymmetries rather than true mineral scarcity. It assesses that export controls and licensing raise prices and uncertainty, catalyzing diversification efforts that can erode dominance over time even as near-term dependence persists.
Open-source reporting indicates the United States and Taiwan are developing a Joint Firepower Cooperation Center to improve asymmetric air and maritime defense through better coordination, training, and potential integration of U.S.-linked capabilities. The initiative appears aligned to a 2027 planning horizon and emphasizes air denial, ISR improvements, and industrial enablement while maintaining ambiguity on troop presence and operational details.
The source reports expanded PLA senior-level purges that further concentrate authority under Xi Jinping, potentially improving control while increasing miscalculation risk. It also describes a 2026 US National Defense Strategy that may be perceived as less confrontational toward the PRC, alongside Taiwan defense integration efforts constrained by opposition-led cuts to air defense and supply-chain resilience funding.
The source reports intensified PLA senior purges that consolidate Xi Jinping’s control while potentially increasing miscalculation risk, alongside a 2026 US National Defense Strategy that deemphasizes PRC competition and omits Taiwan. Taiwan is advancing defense testing and joint firepower coordination concepts, but opposition-led budget proposals could reduce IAMD and supply-chain resilience as PRC influence activity and PLA unmanned modernization accelerate.
Two days of PLA drills on Dec. 29–30 operated closer to Taiwan’s coast and were assessed by analysts in the source as the largest since 2022, with activity consistent with rehearsing blockade-relevant tasks. The episode also highlighted immediate coercive effects through civilian route disruption while leaving open questions about the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions.
The January 30, 2026 update highlights intensified PLA senior-level purges that further centralize authority under Xi Jinping alongside rapid PLA modernization in unmanned systems and maritime strike. It also underscores Taiwan’s push for deeper defense-industrial integration and joint firepower coordination, constrained by legislative disputes over funding for integrated air and missile defense and resilient supply chains.
Japan and the Philippines are expanding defense cooperation through the RAA, OSA, and ACSA, enabling more regular and scalable joint operations along the First Island Chain. The source suggests this is stitching together the East China Sea and South China Sea into a more connected theater, complicating China’s ability to manage maritime tensions as separate fronts.
Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense acknowledged multiple non-combat servicemen deaths in early 2026 and announced emergency measures focused on discipline, safety, psychological screening, and expanded monitoring. The measures are described broadly, and the source notes limited detail on implementation amid ongoing public concern about conscription-related welfare and accountability.
China’s defence ministry said attempts to contain China are “doomed to fail,” while expressing willingness to work with Washington ahead of a reported April Trump–Xi meeting. The US 2026 National Defense Strategy, as described by the source, promotes “respectful relations” but continues to prioritise Indo-Pacific deterrence and denial capabilities along the First Island Chain.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1434 | BNP Landslide in Bangladesh Accelerates Pakistan Outreach, Opens Space for New Minilateral Alignments | Bangladesh | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1335 | Japan Reappoints PM Takaichi: Supermajority Enables Faster Rightward Shift Amid Inflation and China-US Crosswinds | Japan | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1277 | Rare Earth Midstream Chokepoint: Why China’s Processing Edge Remains the Decisive Leverage | Rare Earths | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1246 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and External Deterrence | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-17 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1070 | Rare Earths: China’s Processing Leverage and the Market Forces Poised to Dilute It | Rare Earths | 2026-02-13 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1044 | China’s Rare Earth Chokepoint: Processing and Magnet Dominance Sustains Strategic Leverage | Rare Earths | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1024 | Singapore Airshow 2026 Signals Asia’s Shift to Attritable Drones, Trusted Supply Chains, and Space-Enabled Resilience | Defense Industry | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-916 | China–South Korea Defense Channel Reactivates, SAR Drills Considered as Low-Risk Confidence Measure | China | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-863 | China Flight-Tests No-Moving-Parts Thrust Vectoring Nozzle on High-Subsonic UAV | China | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-849 | Xi Tightens PLA Control as Beijing Reopens KMT Channel and Taiwan’s Asymmetric Budget Stalls | China | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-840 | India’s FY2026–27 Defense Budget Surge Signals Accelerated Modernization and Retaliatory Readiness | India | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-839 | Deterrence and Escalation Dominance in the Taiwan Strait: Lessons from the 1996 Crisis | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-722 | Purges, Perception Gaps, and Drones: Cross-Strait Risk Signals in the January 2026 Update | Taiwan | 2026-02-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-721 | Cross-Strait Deterrence Under Strain: PLA Leadership Purges, US NDS Signaling, and Taiwan’s IAMD Budget Fight | China | 2026-02-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-720 | U.S.–Taiwan Joint Firepower Center Signals Push for Air-Denial and Asymmetric Defense | Taiwan | 2026-02-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-701 | China-Pakistan Ties at 75: Defense Momentum, CPEC 2.0, and the New U.S. Factor | China-Pakistan | 2026-02-05 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-696 | Rare Earths: Processing Chokepoints, Strategic Leverage, and the Limits of China’s Dominance | Rare Earths | 2026-02-04 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-558 | US–Taiwan Joint Firepower Center Signals Accelerated Push for Air Denial and Integrated Defense | Taiwan | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-557 | Xi’s PLA Purges, US NDS Signaling, and Taiwan’s Air Defense Budget Fight Reshape Cross-Strait Risk | China | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-528 | Xi’s PLA Purges, US NDS Signaling, and Taiwan’s IAMD Budget Fight Reshape Cross-Strait Risk | China | 2026-02-02 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-512 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Near Taiwan Signal Blockade Rehearsal and Deterrence Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-511 | Centralized Command, Shifting Signals: Cross-Strait Risk Rises as PLA Modernizes and Taiwan Debates Air Defense | China | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-508 | Japan–Philippines Defense Integration Links East and South China Sea Dynamics | Japan | 2026-02-01 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-372 | Kazakhstan Defense Ministry Announces Emergency Measures After Early-2026 Servicemen Deaths | Kazakhstan | 2026-01-30 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-339 | Beijing Rejects ‘Containment’ as US 2026 Defense Strategy Signals Deterrence with Softer Tone | China-US Relations | 2026-01-29 | 0 | ACCESS » |