// Global Analysis Archive
The ISW–AEI update (data cutoff January 20, 2026) reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling, and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting operations. Taiwan is strengthening leadership defense and air-defense readiness while pursuing a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment, amid domestic debate over the implications for the 'silicon shield.'
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
The January 23, 2026 AEI/ISW update reports a PLA drone flight through Taiwanese airspace over Pratas, large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations likely linked to maritime militia signaling, and PLA drills for leadership-targeting operations. It also highlights Taiwan’s countermeasures to protect senior leadership and a major US–Taiwan trade deal tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update describes a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. It also highlights PLA decapitation-strike training and Taiwan’s leadership-defense upgrades, while noting a major US–Taiwan semiconductor investment-for-tariff deal that may deepen alignment but intensify domestic debate.
The source reports a January 2026 PLA WZ-7 drone flight over Pratas that may be the first confirmed violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace in decades, consistent with a broader PRC effort to normalize incursions and erode Taiwan’s threat awareness. Concurrent CMM vessel formations and PLA “decapitation strike” training underscore a multi-domain coercion posture, while Taiwan accelerates asymmetric unmanned procurement and strengthens leadership defense.
Source reporting through January 20, 2026 describes a PLA drone entering Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, large coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations with potential maritime militia utility, and publicized PLA drills focused on leadership-targeting scenarios. It also outlines a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions, framed as preserving Taiwan’s “silicon shield” while drawing domestic opposition criticism.
The source reports a PLA WZ-7 drone flight through Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside expanded maritime and aerial normalization tactics and large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with state-directed signaling. Taiwan is responding by accelerating asymmetric unmanned procurement, strengthening leadership defense, and deepening US-linked semiconductor investment arrangements while managing domestic political debate.
The source argues Beijing may prioritize a coercive “paralysis” strategy—using ambiguous, incremental quarantine-like pressure—to immobilize Taiwan and slow allied decision-making rather than immediately pursue an amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy import dependence and market-driven shipping/insurance dynamics as key levers that could generate rapid economic pressure under legally reversible, gray-zone enforcement.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan as a large-scale rehearsal of blockade-like operations, including dense air and maritime activity and live-fire near the contiguous zone. Into early 2026, activity reportedly shifted toward normalized coercion, with lower ADIZ sortie levels but continued coast guard pressure near outlying islands.
The source reports a PLA WZ-7 drone flight through Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside expanded CCG/CMM activity and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting strike concepts. Taiwan is responding with enhanced leadership protection and a major increase in unmanned systems procurement, while US–Taiwan economic arrangements deepen strategic coupling amid domestic political debate.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale blockade rehearsal around Taiwan, integrating PLA air, naval, rocket forces and China Coast Guard activity near outlying islands. Taiwan’s January 2026 drills and U.S. calls for dialogue underscore rising operational tempo and increased escalation risk tied to proximity and signaling dynamics.
The ISW–AEI update reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside large-scale PRC fishing vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling near Japan. It also highlights PLA training content focused on leadership-targeting scenarios and Taiwan’s steps to harden leadership defense, while noting a major US–Taiwan semiconductor-linked trade deal amid domestic political debate.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PRC exercise near Taiwan focused on blockade simulation and PLA–CCG coordination, alongside elevated ADIZ activity. Follow-on drills into early 2026 suggest sustained joint-readiness signaling that increases escalation and incident risk around Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The source reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone penetration of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside coordinated maritime militia signaling and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting concepts. Taiwan is responding by scaling asymmetric unmanned procurement, strengthening close-in air defense for leadership protection, and advancing a US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment.
A passenger ferry carrying more than 350 people sank off Basilan province on 26 January 2026, with officials reporting at least 15 dead, 316 rescued, and dozens unaccounted for. The incident highlights persistent maritime safety and emergency-response capacity challenges in remote inter-island corridors, pending an official investigation into the cause.
CSIS open-source analysis indicates China increased military and maritime operational tempo across the Indo-Pacific in 2025, with record activity around Taiwan and heightened South China Sea operations. The report also highlights expanded far-seas training and carrier operations beyond the First Island Chain, alongside fewer but qualitatively notable China-Russia joint exercises.
The PRC’s late-December 2025 Justice Mission 2025 exercise and concurrent coast guard patrols indicate continued rehearsal of blockade and quarantine elements alongside coercive signaling toward Taiwan. The US DoD 2025 China Military Power Report, covering 2024 developments, highlights accelerating PLA modernization and multi-domain coercion while noting potential effectiveness constraints from leadership turnover.
The source describes a major PLA exercise around Taiwan on 29–30 December 2025 featuring dense air sorties, naval and coast guard coordination, and live-fire elements. Analysts cited in the document interpret the activity as rehearsal for blockade-style options and strategic messaging toward the United States amid heightened cross-strait and defense policy tensions.
The source reports that the PRC’s Justice Mission 2025 exercise rehearsed blockade-related operations around Taiwan while CCG patrols tested varied tactics near outlying islands. The accompanying CMPR summary highlights PLA modernization progress in 2024 alongside leadership turnover, and the document flags heightened concern over election influence activity ahead of Taiwan’s 2026 and 2028 votes.
The source describes China’s December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercise as a major Taiwan-focused drill emphasizing blockade mechanics, maritime coordination, and precision-strike integration. While capability development is advancing toward 2027 goals, analysts cited in the document question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, making a 2026 blockade or invasion attempt less likely than continued coercive operations.
The source reports that the PRC conducted the Justice Mission 2025 exercise on December 29–30, rehearsing blockade enforcement and counter-intervention elements while using the event to increase political and psychological pressure on Taiwan. It also highlights expanded China Coast Guard activity around Taiwan’s outlying islands, Taiwan’s internal legislative confrontation, and reporting on potential AI-enabled influence operations ahead of Taiwan’s 2026 and 2028 elections.
Open-source reporting indicates China increased PLA and maritime activity across the Indo-Pacific in 2025, with record pressure around Taiwan and heightened operations in the South China Sea. The same reporting highlights expanded far-seas carrier operations beyond the First Island Chain and fewer—but more novel—China-Russia joint exercises.
The ISW–AEI update (data cutoff January 20, 2026) reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling, and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting operations. Taiwan is strengthening leadership defense and air-defense readiness while pursuing a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment, amid domestic debate over the implications for the 'silicon shield.'
Source reporting describes the PLA’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale, multi-domain operation encircling Taiwan with close-in approaches and integrated PLA Navy–Coast Guard activity. Analysts cited in the document interpret the drills as practical testing for blockade/quarantine contingencies and joint strike integration amid sustained high operational tempo through 2025.
The January 23, 2026 AEI/ISW update reports a PLA drone flight through Taiwanese airspace over Pratas, large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations likely linked to maritime militia signaling, and PLA drills for leadership-targeting operations. It also highlights Taiwan’s countermeasures to protect senior leadership and a major US–Taiwan trade deal tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions.
The January 23, 2026 ISW–AEI update describes a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling. It also highlights PLA decapitation-strike training and Taiwan’s leadership-defense upgrades, while noting a major US–Taiwan semiconductor investment-for-tariff deal that may deepen alignment but intensify domestic debate.
The source reports a January 2026 PLA WZ-7 drone flight over Pratas that may be the first confirmed violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace in decades, consistent with a broader PRC effort to normalize incursions and erode Taiwan’s threat awareness. Concurrent CMM vessel formations and PLA “decapitation strike” training underscore a multi-domain coercion posture, while Taiwan accelerates asymmetric unmanned procurement and strengthens leadership defense.
Source reporting through January 20, 2026 describes a PLA drone entering Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, large coordinated PRC fishing-vessel formations with potential maritime militia utility, and publicized PLA drills focused on leadership-targeting scenarios. It also outlines a major US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment and tariff reductions, framed as preserving Taiwan’s “silicon shield” while drawing domestic opposition criticism.
The source reports a PLA WZ-7 drone flight through Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside expanded maritime and aerial normalization tactics and large-scale PRC fishing-vessel formations consistent with state-directed signaling. Taiwan is responding by accelerating asymmetric unmanned procurement, strengthening leadership defense, and deepening US-linked semiconductor investment arrangements while managing domestic political debate.
The source argues Beijing may prioritize a coercive “paralysis” strategy—using ambiguous, incremental quarantine-like pressure—to immobilize Taiwan and slow allied decision-making rather than immediately pursue an amphibious invasion. It highlights Taiwan’s energy import dependence and market-driven shipping/insurance dynamics as key levers that could generate rapid economic pressure under legally reversible, gray-zone enforcement.
Source reporting describes late-December 2025 PLA exercises around Taiwan as a large-scale rehearsal of blockade-like operations, including dense air and maritime activity and live-fire near the contiguous zone. Into early 2026, activity reportedly shifted toward normalized coercion, with lower ADIZ sortie levels but continued coast guard pressure near outlying islands.
The source reports a PLA WZ-7 drone flight through Taiwanese territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside expanded CCG/CMM activity and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting strike concepts. Taiwan is responding with enhanced leadership protection and a major increase in unmanned systems procurement, while US–Taiwan economic arrangements deepen strategic coupling amid domestic political debate.
The source describes China’s late-December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercises as a large-scale blockade rehearsal around Taiwan, integrating PLA air, naval, rocket forces and China Coast Guard activity near outlying islands. Taiwan’s January 2026 drills and U.S. calls for dialogue underscore rising operational tempo and increased escalation risk tied to proximity and signaling dynamics.
The ISW–AEI update reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone violation of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside large-scale PRC fishing vessel formations consistent with maritime militia signaling near Japan. It also highlights PLA training content focused on leadership-targeting scenarios and Taiwan’s steps to harden leadership defense, while noting a major US–Taiwan semiconductor-linked trade deal amid domestic political debate.
Source reporting describes a late-December 2025 PRC exercise near Taiwan focused on blockade simulation and PLA–CCG coordination, alongside elevated ADIZ activity. Follow-on drills into early 2026 suggest sustained joint-readiness signaling that increases escalation and incident risk around Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The source reports a likely first-in-decades PLA drone penetration of Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas, alongside coordinated maritime militia signaling and PLA training content emphasizing leadership-targeting concepts. Taiwan is responding by scaling asymmetric unmanned procurement, strengthening close-in air defense for leadership protection, and advancing a US–Taiwan trade arrangement tied to semiconductor investment.
A passenger ferry carrying more than 350 people sank off Basilan province on 26 January 2026, with officials reporting at least 15 dead, 316 rescued, and dozens unaccounted for. The incident highlights persistent maritime safety and emergency-response capacity challenges in remote inter-island corridors, pending an official investigation into the cause.
CSIS open-source analysis indicates China increased military and maritime operational tempo across the Indo-Pacific in 2025, with record activity around Taiwan and heightened South China Sea operations. The report also highlights expanded far-seas training and carrier operations beyond the First Island Chain, alongside fewer but qualitatively notable China-Russia joint exercises.
The PRC’s late-December 2025 Justice Mission 2025 exercise and concurrent coast guard patrols indicate continued rehearsal of blockade and quarantine elements alongside coercive signaling toward Taiwan. The US DoD 2025 China Military Power Report, covering 2024 developments, highlights accelerating PLA modernization and multi-domain coercion while noting potential effectiveness constraints from leadership turnover.
The source describes a major PLA exercise around Taiwan on 29–30 December 2025 featuring dense air sorties, naval and coast guard coordination, and live-fire elements. Analysts cited in the document interpret the activity as rehearsal for blockade-style options and strategic messaging toward the United States amid heightened cross-strait and defense policy tensions.
The source reports that the PRC’s Justice Mission 2025 exercise rehearsed blockade-related operations around Taiwan while CCG patrols tested varied tactics near outlying islands. The accompanying CMPR summary highlights PLA modernization progress in 2024 alongside leadership turnover, and the document flags heightened concern over election influence activity ahead of Taiwan’s 2026 and 2028 votes.
The source describes China’s December 2025 “Justice Mission 2025” exercise as a major Taiwan-focused drill emphasizing blockade mechanics, maritime coordination, and precision-strike integration. While capability development is advancing toward 2027 goals, analysts cited in the document question the PLA’s ability to sustain a prolonged blockade under contested conditions, making a 2026 blockade or invasion attempt less likely than continued coercive operations.
The source reports that the PRC conducted the Justice Mission 2025 exercise on December 29–30, rehearsing blockade enforcement and counter-intervention elements while using the event to increase political and psychological pressure on Taiwan. It also highlights expanded China Coast Guard activity around Taiwan’s outlying islands, Taiwan’s internal legislative confrontation, and reporting on potential AI-enabled influence operations ahead of Taiwan’s 2026 and 2028 elections.
Open-source reporting indicates China increased PLA and maritime activity across the Indo-Pacific in 2025, with record pressure around Taiwan and heightened operations in the South China Sea. The same reporting highlights expanded far-seas carrier operations beyond the First Island Chain and fewer—but more novel—China-Russia joint exercises.
| ID | Title | Category | Date | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPT-1392 | PRC Raises Pressure on Taiwan with Pratas Airspace Probe, Maritime Militia Signaling, and Decapitation-Strike Messaging | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1386 | Justice Mission 2025: PLA Normalizes Close-In Blockade Rehearsals Around Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1334 | Pratas Airspace Breach and Maritime Militia Signaling Raise Cross-Strait Escalation Risks | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-18 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1164 | Pratas Airspace Probe and Maritime Militia Signaling Raise Cross-Strait Threshold Risks | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1037 | PLA Drone Over Pratas Signals New Phase in Airspace Pressure as Maritime Militia Massing and Decapitation Drills Intensify | Taiwan | 2026-02-12 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-996 | PRC Raises Pressure Thresholds Around Taiwan as US–Taiwan Semiconductor Deal Reshapes Strategic Calculus | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-11 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-962 | PLA Airspace Probe Over Pratas Signals Escalating Gray-Zone Pressure and Operational Experimentation | Taiwan | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-960 | Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: How a Quarantine Strategy Could Bypass Red Lines | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-10 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-846 | PLA ‘Justice Mission 2025’ Drills Signal Blockade-Rehearsal Posture, Followed by Normalized Pressure in Early 2026 | PLA | 2026-02-08 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-819 | PLA Airspace Probe at Pratas Signals Intensifying Gray-Zone Pressure on Taiwan | Taiwan | 2026-02-07 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-618 | Justice Mission 2025: Blockade Rehearsal Signals Higher-Tempo Cross-Strait Pressure | Taiwan Strait | 2026-02-03 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-459 | PRC Gray-Zone Pressure Intensifies: Pratas Airspace Probe, Maritime Militia Signaling, and PLA Leadership-Targeting Drills | Taiwan Strait | 2026-01-31 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-365 | Blockade-Centric Signaling: PRC ‘Justice Mission 2025’ and the Intensification of Cross-Strait Pressure | Taiwan Strait | 2026-01-30 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-316 | PLA Drone Airspace Breach Over Pratas Signals Escalating Threshold Tests Around Taiwan | Taiwan | 2026-01-29 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-205 | Philippines Ferry Sinking off Basilan Triggers Major Rescue Operation and Renewed Maritime Safety Scrutiny | Philippines | 2026-01-26 | 1 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-848 | China’s 2025 Indo-Pacific Operational Surge: Higher Baselines Near Taiwan, Intensified South China Sea Pressure, and Expanded Far-Seas Reach | PLA | 2025-12-28 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-594 | Justice Mission 2025 Signals PRC Focus on Taiwan Isolation Scenarios and Multi-Domain Pressure | Taiwan Strait | 2025-10-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1262 | Justice Mission-2025 Signals Intensifying PLA Blockade-Rehearsal Posture Around Taiwan | PLA | 2025-09-15 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-619 | Justice Mission 2025 Signals PRC Blockade Rehearsal and Multi-Domain Pressure on Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2025-09-14 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-1329 | PLA Taiwan Drills Signal Blockade Readiness and Routinized Pressure into 2026 | Taiwan Strait | 2025-08-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-366 | PRC Justice Mission 2025 Blockade Drill Signals Intensifying Multi-Domain Pressure on Taiwan | Taiwan Strait | 2025-08-20 | 0 | ACCESS » |
| RPT-818 | China’s 2025 Indo-Pacific Military Tempo: Higher Baselines Near Taiwan, Expanded Far-Seas Reach | PLA | 2025-07-27 | 0 | ACCESS » |